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found it a peculiar sort of rhetoric, nevertheless, because it seemed to
him that it is a mad world that spends 208 billion dollars a year on
armaments. We should, he suggested, work for a better system. A
presidential candidate who says he will cut back 20-30 billion dollars
a year on arms production may be more significant and important than
SALT will ever be in the long run. He expressed dismay at the transfer
of small arms to the Third World by the Big Powers. We need, he
urged, to engage our Third World counterparts in a serious discussion
on why it would not be more significant for them to have a security
arrangement of a peacekeeping nature through a centralized authority,
rather than continue building up their own armies.
The CHAIRMAN remarked that we all agree that it is a mad world,
but the right remedy for improving it is another matter.
ALAN GERSON

Reporter

EXPULSION AND EXPATRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:

THE RIGHT TO LEAVE, TO STAY, AND TO RETURN
The panel convened at 10:30 a.m. April 13, 1973, Rosalyn Higgins"'
presiding.
The CHAIRMAN emphasized the profound importance and interdependence of the rights to leave, stay, and return. She cautioned that, although
the topic encompassed disparate cases-the exodus of Soviet Jewry, the
claims of Palestinians, and the question of amnesty for draft dodgerssterile debate on specific issues should be avoided. Rather a conceptual
framework linking these separate cases should be sought.
REMARKS BY

YASH P. GHAI*:::

I propose to discuss the topic through an examination of the practice
in East Africa, especially as it relates to its Asian community. There
is considerable confusion in the rules of international law on this topic.
Few rules are above controversy and in many instances, the practice
goes against what are alleged to be the rules. The answer in several
instances depends on interrelated but separate issues, each of which
might be controversial. Lack of clear answers is partly due to the great
number of variables. Additionally, some of these variables are matters
properly governed by international law; others by domestic law.
Moreover, there is, generally speaking, a need for greater consensus
among states on the scope of the variables before the set of rules can
function effectively. Thus questions of nationality are central, but the
Affairs.
** Former Dean of the Dar es-Salaam Law Faculty.
* Royal Institute of International

jurisdiction over them is domestic; problems of statelessness are controversial; the right to leave a country may depend on the right to enter
another; the possibility of expelling a person is contingent on the obligation or the willingness of another country to receive him.
At the independence of the East African countries of Kenya, Uganda,
and Tanzania, a number of considerations affecting the right to stay
and the right to leave came up for resolution. Most of them arose in
relation to members of the Asian and European immigrant communities.
A great deal of the discussion turned on the point of citizenship. Until
independence most of the residents of East Africa were British citizens
or British protected persons, the distinction turning on the status of
the country. In the colony of Kenya the residents were British citizens
and in the other two countries, a protectorate and a trusteeship, the
residents were British protected persons. It was assumed that the
indigenous inhabitants would become citizens of the independent
countries. As far as others were concerned, those who were born in
the country and one of whose parents was also born there would automatically become citizens; the rest would be eligible to become citizens
if they so applied within two years of independence.
The implications of citizenship were reasonably clearly understood.
It was clear, for example, that those who did not become citizens might
at some stage be asked to leave East Africa (although the Kenya constitution at independence had guaranteed noncitizen residents against
expulsion). It was also understood that those who did not become citizens of an East African country but retained British citizenship would
have the right to enter Britain. The 1962 British legislation restricting
the rights of entry into Britain of Commonwealth citizens did not apply
to British passport holders and thus exempted the East African Asians.
It was also understood that those who did become citizens of a country
in East Africa would have the right to stay and work in that country.
It was clear that those who did not become citizens could not expect
not to suffer discrimination in employment policies. People who had
options as regards nationality made decisions on the basis of these understandings. The concept of citizenship was crucial in the determination
of the rights to stay and to enter. An attempt was made to move away
from racial criteria that had so dominated British policy and practice
in its administration in East Africa and to move to constitutional and
technical criteria of citizenship. A large number of Asians opted to
become citizens of an East African country but the majority, at least
in Kenya and Uganda, did not.
It is clear from the practice in East Africa that a number of these
expectations have been frustrated. Most countries have embarked on
policies which in some sense go against understandings at the time
of independence. The most glaring instance, of course, is the expulsion
of the Asian community from Uganda by General Amin. The Asians
expelled from Uganda fell into various categories. A great number were
British passport holders and a few were Indian citizens. An early order
of Amin's also required the expulsion of Asians who were Ugandan citi-

zens, but this order was subsequently withdrawn under pressure from
some Ugandan Africans who felt that it was important to maintain the
integrity of the concept of citizenship. Nevertheless, the Amin government proceeded to revoke the citizenship of a large number of Asians
who had become Ugandan citizens. Having thus been declared stateless, they were liable to expulsion. Zanzibar, which is now a part of the
Republic of Tanzania, imposed a number of restrictions on the right
of Asians to leave that island. In certain instances the right to leave
is completely prohibited, while in others the right to leave is conditional
on the payment of large fees. Kenya has expelled a certain number
of its citizens, generally by first revoking their citizenship.
There has emerged a growing class of stateless people within East
Africa. A number of Asians who were citizens of Zanzibar but moved
away from the island during certain periods of time were declared no
longer citizens of Zanzibar and hence, now are not citizens of the United
Republic of Tanzania. The fact of Kenya's deprivation of citizenship
of its deported citizens also has made them stateless and we have already
referred to the statelessness of groups within Uganda. There has also
been a certain amount of forced movement of persons within East Africa.
Thus in 1960, Uganda expelled 40,000 black Kenyans who had been
gainfully employed and residents of Uganda for many years. All three
governments in East Africa have formulated and are implementing
policies of Africanization of the public services as well as the private
sector. These policies have resulted in the gradual expulsion of large
numbers of noncitizen Asians.
A number of comments may be made on these developments before
proceeding to an analysis of their significance from the point of view
of international law. First of all, the practice of expulsions or forced
movements of persons within Africa is not a purely racial matter. Uganda
expelled black Kenyans before it expelled the Asians, and the expulsion
from countries in West Africa and Zaire has involved, in almost all
cases, black Africans. Most countries in Africa are under great political
and economic pressures, and have problems in establishingviable political and economic systems. Acute tensions arise from unemployment;
the leaders of a country feel primary responsibility to its own citizens,
which they feel can only be discharged by the expulsion of its noncitizens.
Secondly, the countries in Africa, particularly those in East Africa,
were left a difficult legacy by the colonial masters. The groups ofpersons
in relation to whom questions of expulsion have arisen most acutely
are those who were brought to these countries by the colonial powers
for the purposes of colonial administration. Some of the present tensions
arise from the failure of the colonial powers to resolve these problems
before the dissolution of the empire. The colonial society was a racially
exploitative one, in which the Europeans and Asians enjoyed preference
over Africans, and in which the economy was dominated by alien groups.
A policy of fair distribution would of necessity imply some restrictions
on Asians and Europeans.

Thirdly, in relation specifically to East Africa, it can be argued that
a very heavy responsibility rests with the British Government. As
already mentioned, Asians who decided to retain British nationality did
so on the basis of a clear understanding, acquiesced in by the British
Government, that there would be an unrestricted right to enter into
Britain. However, in 1968, when the governments in East Africa began
to implement the expected policy of Africanization resulting in the
immigration to Britain of many Asians, Britain passed legislation to
restrict the rights of entry into Britain of its Asian citizens. Thus the
problems became aggravated. If Britain had not introduced the restrictive legislation, a number of the noncitizen Asians would gradually have
been able to leave East Africa. As it was, they were not able to leave
and this created enormous tensions within East Africa. This also made
the position of the Asians who had become citizens of East African
countries extremely difficult. It was not only in this respect that Britain
failed to live up to its obligations to its Asian citizens; in other aspects
of its decolonialization policy it had shown little regard for their fate.
This is in contrast to the solicitude it showed for its white citizens
in East Africa. All the white civil servants in East Africa were enabled
to retire prematurely under a special scheme whereby they would make
handsome financial gains. Proposals of a similar scheme for the Asian
civil servants were rejected by the British Government.
Secondly, European farmers were enabled to sell their farms at high
prices so that they could leave East Africa with the land being transferred
to Africans. Proposals for a scheme to buy out Asian businesses were
turned down by the British.
Thirdly, the British Government enacted special legislation as
regarded citizenship which applied basically to white citizens only.
This is the 1964 British Nationality Act (No. 2), which was meant to
get around the East African laws prohibiting dual nationality. Under
the British legislation, those who gave up British citizenship to become
citizens of an East African country can at any time reclaim British
nationality. Such persons then have superior rights to those Asian citizens who had always retained British nationality.
Many of the problems that have risen in East Africa can be regarded
as those of decolonialization and they all stem from Britain's unwillingness to discharge the obligations it incurred at the time of the establishment of the empire. Governments in East Africa have been saddled
with problems that really belong to Britain. The fairness of holding
these governments to rigid international standards of nonracial treatment
in the face of Britain's behavior may well be questioned.
As to the significance of East African practice for international law,
first it is clear that East Africa does not accept the principle of a vested
right of residence or rights to carry on a business or profession. Many
of the Asians who have been expelled have been residents in East Africa
for years, if not actually born there, and it has not been argued that
this has vested in them any right to stay on. No foreign governments,

not even the governments of the nationals expelled, have questioned
the right of the East African governments to expel them. Until the
Uganda expulsions, however, there were no mass expulsions and it may
be argued that mass expulsions pose a different set of problems from
the expulsion of individuals. But there has been no real question of
the wide powers to expel noncitizens.
Secondly, the rule that there is no right to expel citizens is generally
accepted. In this respect it is significant that even Amin felt compelled
to withdraw his order against the Uganda-Asian citizens, and that when
Kenya, for example, has wished to deport a citizen it has first deprived
him of his Kenyan citizenship.
Thirdly, in East Africa the principle of the right of entry of citizens
is clearly recognized. As far as the British position is concerned, it
can be stated that there is no automatic right of entry for its citizens.
The British position is that, while there may be a right of entry, it
can be subjected to various conditions. The most the British have
accepted is that it may have an obligation to accept those citizens expelled
by another country. For example, if a country expels a British citizen,
the British would have to accept him. But British practice has made
clear that this is not an obligation it owes to the citizens but to the
other state. It is likely that Britain has used this interpretation to make
deals with governments in East Africa whereby those governments do
not expel British citizens, even though they are denied the right to work
and are unemployed. Such persons cannot, therefore, claim the right
to enter Britain. Britain has also sought to introduce factors additional
to citizenship as entitling one to enter the country. The notion of a
substantive link introduced through the concept of a patrial is a novel
development. Although sometimes justified on the basis of the Nottebohm case, it is difficult to see how that case supports the British
position.

Fourthly, the practice in East Africa has shown that there is no real
protection against deprivation of citizenship and therefore the emergence

ofa class of stateless persons. The domestic legislation of these countries
prohibits governments from depriving a citizen of citizenship acquired
through birth. In relation to those who were registered or naturalized
(a category which includes the bulk of the Asian community), however,
the governments can take away such citizenship without giving any
reasons and there appears to be no mechanism of review or appeal.
There is no doubt that practice in East Africa goes against the Convention on the Elimination of Statelessness.
Finally, the British law in practice introduces a racially discriminating
factor in immigration legislation. Even though the British legislation
is not based explicitly on racial criteria, its effect nevertheless is to
introduce the racial factor in practice. In this sense, the British legislation contravenes various UN declarations and conventions on racial discrimination. It was in fact the actions of the British Government which
have for the first time introduced racial discrimination in legislation
about citizenship and immigration and, if the laws and the practice in

East Africa have shown a similar tendency, they are in one sense a
reaction to the British initiatives. In that sense, Britain has done a
great disservice to the cause of the progressive development of international law.
REMARKS BY LUNG-CHU CHEN*

This discussion on "Expulsion and Expatriation in International Law"
is very timely indeed. Today we are witnessing a new type of people
"in orbit," not astronauts but "refugees in orbit." In a recent bulletin,
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees vividly describes how a typical
refugee in orbit wandered from country to country over the past half
year in quest of some one country that might let him in and stay. What
made the case dramatic was that during that long period the refugee
was shuffled from airplane to airplane, and confined in airports. Compelled to leave the country of residence and lacking proper identity
and travel documents, many people cannot disembark legally anywhere.
In earlier times there was always the possibility of jumping ship. But
today, under the closed national boundary system policed by more sophisticated entry and exit control, such unfortunate persons are condemned
to a nightmarish cycle of enforced airplane journeys and periods of practical imprisonment in airport waiting rooms.
Although my focus will be on the right to return, it needs to be underlined that the right to return is closely related to the other two rights
(the right to leave and to stay), and it is a major component of the overall
problem of freedom of movement for people across national boundaries.
Claims to "return" to a territorial community are, thus, part of a more
general claim of access to a territorial community, either for temporary
or permanent purposes, by both members and nonmembers of that
community. "Return" implies that people seeking entry to a particular
territorial community view that community as a "homeland," as a "state
of origin." Hence the focus here is somewhat narrower than the general
claims of access to territory. These people seek return to the territorial
community of which they are still or were once members (nationals
or long-term residents), or of which their ancestors were members. The
people with whom we are concerned have some distinctive link in the
sense of actual and significant ties with that community.
Claims for return to a territorial community are put forward either
on an individual basis or as a group claim. Individual claims are relatively easy to handle. Group claims for return to a particular territory
are more complex, for these claims are often intertwined with the legal
doctrines concerning self-determination, state succession, and so on.
Group claims for the right of return arise in a variety of circumstances.
Here are some notable examples:
In Europe: Europeans displaced by World War II, particularly because
of the delimitation of new national boundaries, seeking to return to their
homelands.
* Yale Law School.

In Asia: Arab refugees seeking to return to Palestine; Jews in the
Arab countries, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere seeking to return to
Israel; Pakistanis seeking to return to Pakistan from Bangladesh; Bengalis
in Pakistan seeking to return to Bangladesh; Chinese refugees in Hong
Kong; Nationalist Chinese in Taiwan seeking to recover and return to
Mainland China; Taiwanese abroad seeking to return to Taiwan; and
the refugees on both sides of Vietnam and of Korea seeking to return
to their homes.
In Africa: Sudanese refugees seeking to return to Sudan; expelled
Asians in East Africa seeking entry into Great Britain, India, or Pakistan;
Biafrans seeking to return to Nigeria; and freedom fighters seeking to
return to Southern Africa and the Portuguese controlled territories.
In the Americas: U.S. draft dodgers and deserters seeking to return
to the United States; Cuban refugees seeking to free Cuba and return
to Cuba; and Haitians seeking to return to their own land.
Some of today's most pressing claims to return concern populations
displaced by wars (external and internal), revolutions, political upheavals
and oppression, conquest, decolonization, partition, or the change of
status of a territory. Thus the 20th century has been called the century
of homeless people, the century of refugees who seek freedom from
violence and political persecution by moving from land to land.
Apart from these dramatic crisis situations, there are countless instances
in which people move and claim to reenter their own homelands. They
are impelled to move for many reasons having no relation to immediate
crises. It is part of the ongoing process of transnational interaction in
which people move across national boundaries to pursue values of all
kinds in this world of ever-increasing interdependence and everincreasing mobility.
While the nation-state is still the predominant participant in the world
arena, other participants, particularly individual human beings, are
becoming more assertive. In the name of human dignity and human
rights, individuals demand maximum freedom of movement, both internally and transnationally. They demand in particular the freedom to
return to the territorial community with which they believe they have
significant ties, and to return under conditions of respect for human
dignity and human rights. Assurance of personal safety and freedom
are vital: they do not seek to return to their homeland only to be persecuted. In the face of the increasing assertiveness of the individual,
nation-state elites strive to maintain and exercise their traditional competence to control and regulate the flow of people, in addition to controlling
the flow of goods and ideas. The primary concern of nation-state elites
is, of course, to control people in relation to resources as a base of national
power. Hence the underlying question is how to harmonize the
individual's freedom of movement with the necessity of the nation-state
to regulate and control people because of its security, development,
absorbing capacity, or other considerations, with due regard to the value
consequences beyond the claimants immediately involved.

The policy which most of us as scholarly observers would recommend
is progress toward a nonsegregated world of human dignity in which
people, resources, and ideas can move freely so as to achieve optimum
shaping and sharing of all values, and in which the present disparities
in the distribution of people in relation to resources could eventually
be redressed equitably around the globe. We favor the utmost freedom
for the individual in the choice of place to live, work, enjoy, and retire.
Hence, apart from general freedom of movement, a particularly strong
presumption is for freedom to return to the territorial community with
which one has significant ties. Every body politic should be perfectly
willing to have people of different cultures and perspectives return.
Indeed, giien the present configuration of the world constitutive
process, the community against which the individual can claim some
significant ties should be made to bear primary responsibility for affording
him the opportunities of life. But we repudiate coerced return. Freedom
to return implies that an individual should not be made to return to
his land without his consent, whether he is a refugee or not.
As policies, like legal doctrines, operate in pairs of complementarity,
the presumption for freedom to return needs to be balanced by other
public order considerations-the maintenance of security, health, morals,
development, and so on for the particular community, taking into account
also the impact on neighboring and other states, the regional community,
and the world community.
In deference to contemporary emphasis upon human rights, when
the individual's claim to return is challenged by the state, the burden
of proof should rest on the state seeking to establish the necessity for
restrictions on return (in terms of security and other public order considerations) and the appropriateness of its measures by reference to the
authorized legal procedure. Similarly, the measures taken by the state
should be required to be temporary in nature (only to the extent
necessary), and not to be contrary to contemporary peremptory norms
(jus cogens). The state should not, further, be permitted to take arbitrary
measures, such as denationalization (deprivation of nationality), complex
reentry requirements or exactions of outrageous fees, to deny the
individual's freedom to return. Finally, the decision of the nation-state
in restricting the individual's freedom of return should be subject to
review by inclusive decisionmakers of the world community.
In relating these recommended policies to alternative consequences
of one choice or another, it is vital that all relevant factors in a given
situation be appraised contextually, with the significance of each being
made a function of its relation to all the others.
In earlier times when national boundaries were relatively open, transnational interaction was less frequent, and means of transportation and
communication were relatively underdeveloped, the question concerning freedom of transnational movement was of minor consequence.
Furthermore, as international law was regarded as concerned "exclusively" with nation-states, it was often indifferent to the fate of the

individual. The whole problem of movement for people was approached
not from the perspective of the protection of human rights of the
individual, but from the paramount consideration of protecting and consolidating the bases of power of states, control over people being a principal source of power bases. Hence customary international law recognized the exclusive competence ofthe nation-state to control and regulate
people for entry into its territory, a manifestation of what was said to
be "sovereignty" of the state.
The growing contemporary concern for the protection of human beings,
as symbolized by global and regional human rights programs, is challenging the traditional exclusive competence of the nation-state to regiment
people and to regulate their movement. As state power is deemphasized, people's power is stressed. Concern for the right of return is an
expression of the increasing general concern for the protection and fulfillment of human rights. Thus specific new prescriptions have developed
in regard to the right to return.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims in its Article
13 (para. 2) that "Everyone has the right . . . to return to his country"
(Art. 13, para. 2). The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights puts it this way: "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the
right to enter his own country" (Art. 12, para. 4). On the regional level,
the European Convention on Human Rights states that: "No one shall
be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the state of which he
is a national" (4th Protocol, Art. 3, para. 2). The American Convention
on Human Rights also affirms that no one may be deprived of the right
to enter the territory of the state of which he is a national (Art. 22,
para. 5). These provisions, although phrased in general terms, are
unequivocal in affirming community expectations about the right of
return insofar as nationals are concerned. Article 5 of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
further stresses nondiscrimination in the exercise of this right.
To highlight the basic unity of mankind in freedom of movement,
the Uppsala colloquium was convened in June 1972 to formulate detailed
principles for guiding and facilitating the liberal application of the freedom to leave and to return. Aside from reaffirming the general freedom
of a national to return to his country, the Uppsala Declaration sought
to fortify the right to return in these terms:
No person shall be deprived of his nationality for the purpose of
divesting him of the right to return to his country (Art. 10).
No person shall be required as a condition of the exercise of the
right to return to his country of nationality to pay exorbitant fees,
special taxes or similar exactions (Art. 11).
The re-entry of long-term residents who are not nationals, including
stateless persons, may be refused only in the most exceptional circumstances (Art. 12).
Under customary international law it is of course generally accepted
that a body politic has the competence to set limitations on the admission

of aliens to its territory, either for temporary or permanent purposes.
The actual exercise of this competence is restrained by treaty, comity,
and the practical need of interactions with people of other communities.
This continues to be the prevailing practice today, as evidenced by
the omission of any stipulation of the right of access of non-nationals
to a territorial community in any of the human rights conventions mentioned above. The prime exception is to allow long-term residents (nonnationals) to return to the land of domicile. (Some scholars have justified
this on the theory of "acquired rights.") On the other hand, it is equally
well established that nationals shall not be denied the right of entry
into their own country, as seen in customary international law and recent
human rights prescriptions.
The general right of nationals to return to their own country, however,
is hampered and frustrated by various practical limitations and pretexts:
(1) Claimants are subjected to onerous burdens in proving their
nationality;
(2) Some nation-states use decrees of denationalization to deny the
right of entry of their own nationals;
(3) Cumbersome requirements for obtaining passports or reentry permits are made applicable to nationals;
(4) Excessive fees for return are imposed;
(5) Certain people are classified as a special category of nationals
whose right to entry is curtailed;
(6) Persecution or the threat of persecution is used to prevent and
deter refugees from returning to their land of origin.
With regard to refugees, the principle of nonrefoulement has become
well established in international law. According to the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and other related
instruments, refugees shall not be returned against their will to the land
of origin where they are in danger of political persecution. Meanwhile,
efforts have been made to establish the right of voluntary repatriation
for refugees, as symbolized by Article 5 of the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of 1969. This
article reads in part as follows:
1. The essentially voluntary character of repatriation shall be
respected in all cases and no refugee shall be repatriated against
his will.
2. The country of asylum, in collaboration with the country oforigin,
shall make adequate arrangements for the safe return of refugees
who request repatriation.

3. The country of origin, on receiving back refugees, shall facilitate
their resettlement and grant them the full rights and privileges of
nationals of the country, and subject them to the same obligations.
4. Refugees who voluntarily return to their country shall in no way
be penalized for having left it for any of the reasons giving rise
to refugee situations .

. ..

The present state of practice concerning the individual's freedom of
movement and return leaves much to be desired. Pending the achievement of a world commonwealth of free men in which people can move
freely from land to land as independent human beings, the right to return
to a territorial community should be extended from nationals to all other
persons who have significant ties with that particular community.
One way to check the arbitrary exercise of power of exclusion by
the nation-state is to make it bear the primary burden in justifying its
decision on exclusion and to subject its decisions to review by an international agency empowered with adequate authority and control. In the
most ideal world, the international agency would further be empowered
to make certain that the individual choosing to exercise his right of
return could do so with security in the enjoyment of all human rights.
When freedom of movement becomes a reality, when people are free
to reenter where they came from and to choose the place to live, work,
enjoy, and retire, we may bid farewell to "the century of homeless
people," and help usher in a century of human dignity.
REMARKS BY VALERIE CHALIDZE*

"Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own"this can be considered the basic philosophical principle of social relations
just because it asserts the right of everyone to leave the territory of
any state and therefore to escape the jurisdiction of any state. Although
conditions in the world must change substantially for this principle to
be always practicable, the import of its proclamation is the recognition
that state sovereignty over the individual can be limited in the future.
In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights this principle is affirmed
without reference to limitations. The Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights does contain reservations and thereby tries to reconcile the ideal
principle with the real state of the world. But the restrictions imposed
on this right in the Covenant can be interpreted as loosely as one pleases,
and the legislation or practice of different states can limit still more
the right to leave the country. Thus it is important to formulate principles
concerning the minimum restrictions governing this right which are compatible with reality but which also emphasize that a state's right to restrict
freedom to leave the country cannot be interpreted in certain cases as
a right in practice to deny an individual this freedom.
The only question should be: Has any country agreed to admit the
person concerned? In practical terms, this is a natural limitation on
the freedom under discussion. However, unless under treaty obligation
to provide lawful assistance to other states in this sphere, a state should
not make a guarantee that a person will be admitted to the country of
destination a prerequisite for permission to depart. (This requirement
exists in the Soviet Union but is not based on statute.) Even if all states
should agree to such mutual assistance, the right to leave a country should
not depend on an entry visa to any country. It is important to recall in
* Co-Founder, Soviet Committee on Human Rights.

this connection the evident right of everyone to use of that space which
is not under the jurisdiction of any country, and in particular to use of the
open sea.

In practical terms these questions are not now urgent, but

that is no reason to consider them unimportant in principle.
The right of convicted persons and persons under investigation to
leave a country: When I discussed aspects of this question in my report
to the Uppsala Conference on the Right to Leave, I asserted that if
criminal punishment is considered a means of social defense rather than
revenge for an act committed, then the right of a convicted person to
leave a country should be recognized, if that person does not want to

live in the society whose interests are protected by the state which
condemned him. Clearly emigration of persons who have committed
actions considered criminal by generally accepted standards will not
be encouraged by other states; recognition of the right of convicted persons to leave a country will, in practice, affect individuals who have
committed acts not criminally punishable in all countries. Acknowledg-

ment of this right, even if partial, can be important for the protection
of persons against political persecution. Of course, special agreements
or unilateral decisions can make provision for appropriate exceptions
in case of misuse of this right or in case of its utilization in interstate

conflicts, especially where international terrorism is involved.
Considered recognition of the right of convicted persons to leave a
country would be in keeping with the general principle stated at the
beginning of these remarks. This principle seems unrealistic in practical
terms but perhaps it can be implemented in certain cases, namely in
those instances when political persecution seriously damages the prestige of a country. With particular regard to the USSR, its leaders might
seek to restore some Soviet prestige by offering the right of departure
to at least some political prisoners (especially those convicted in connection with attempts to leave the USSR). From Sovietjuridical practice
to date, we know of only a few cases where the right of convicted foreigners to leave the country was recognized and one case where an exit
permit for Israel was issued to an individual sentenced to correctional
labor without deprivation of freedom (the Shapiro case). It is not known
whether this exit permit was granted through a special procedure or
through an oversight.
The right of those under investigation to leave a country evidently
cannot be affirmed in general, as participation in judicial proceedings
of reasonable duration may be regarded as one of the formalities necessary
prior to receipt of permission for departure. In one case from Soviet
practice, an application for an exit visa was refused to a person declared
under suspicion by the procurator more than six months before (the

Myuge case).
Although the principle under consideration seems quite unrealistic
in general, in concrete cases this approach does not seem strange. For
instance, Israel is ready to admit persons convicted in the USSR in
connection with their desire to go to Israel; Leyden University invited
Bukovsky after his conviction in the USSR to continue his studies in

the Netherlands; and the University of Leeds invited the mathematician
Shikhanovich, who is under investigation, to deliver lectures in England.
The right of convicted persons and persons under investigation to
remain in their country: I know of no violations of this right in Soviet
practice. In theory, former Soviet criminal legislation did not recognize
this right for persons convicted and sentenced to exile after having been
proclaimed enemies of the workers, but it appears that such sentences
were not imposed in practice. In those countries where exile exists
as a measure of punishment, the right of a convicted person to remain
in his country is not violated if the convicted person enjoys a free choice
between exile and some other form of punishment.
The right of convicted persons and persons under investigation to
return to their country: The meaning of the words "their country"
as relevant to the problem of return is very uncertain. It is possible
to maintain that the right of a Soviet citizen to return is guaranteed
by the acknowledgment ofthe freedom to choose one's place ofresidence.
In practice, the right to return is not ordinarily violated with respect
to persons whom the authorities consider Soviet citizens. Other
individuals who consider the USSR their country can experience serious
difficulties in realizing the right to return. The right to return is not
apparently violated with respect to Soviet citizens who are under investigation or who have been convicted, but a special problem exists in
that these persons may not know that they are returning as suspects
or convicted individuals. After the war this question affected thousands
of persons liberated from German prison camps by allied armies. On
their return to the USSR, they were usually sentenced to deprivation
of freedom for surrendering to the Germans. (The average sentence
given was ten years.) Now this uncertainty affects those who return
after departure from the USSR in violation of officially established procedure or after an earlier refusal to return. Usually punishment under
the articles of the criminal code on treason awaits such individuals,
with the rare exceptions of those instances where the authorities conclude
thatthe case has no political significance; then the person is held responsible only for illegal departure or flight from the USSR or is entirely freed
from liability. For example, the physicist Sayasov remained abroad for
personal reasons but soon returned. He was not tried, but public censure
was so severe that he could not find work for several years. Punishment
in some cases may be death, but the average penalty imposed is 10
years deprivation of liberty. There is no problem involving freedom
to return to the USSR for such individuals if they surrender to the Soviet
Union as criminals (for instance the case of Strolman who had sought
asylum in Yugoslavia; the case of Kudirka who, after asking asylum in
America, was returned to Soviet control by the United States). In cases
of voluntary return such "defectors" as a rule suffer no limitation of
their right to enter the USSR, but on arrival certainly those who have
asked political asylum are punished. There are many such cases (for
example, the case of the artist Nakashidze). The individuals involved
do not know when they return if they are under investigation or have

been convicted since a criminal case is apparently always initiated, but
the investigation may be suspended or a court may hear the case in
their absence. (Proceedings in the absence of the defendant are permitted in such cases by Article 246 of the Criminal Procedural Code
of the RSFSR.) So far as I know, neither the subject of investigation
nor his representatives in the USSR are ordinarily informed about the
beginning of an investigation or about court proceedings. On one occasion I did learn through documentary evidence that such a case had
been initiated and then suspended (the case of Levin, now a resident
of the United States). Even confirmation of the confiscation of property,
which is sanctioned by the criminal code in cases involving treason,
is not conclusive evidence of a court sentence, since the law also provides
for administrative confiscation of property of persons "defecting" abroad
for political reaons. (Summary Law on Requisition and Confiscation
of Property, 1928).
I consider this question quite important not only because the possibilit' of exercising a right can be decisive for an individual but also because
of the conditions governing his exercise of this right and the possible
consequences of this action.
Since court proceedings in the absence of the defendant are possible
in these cases, since the law sanctions capital punishment for treason,
since no published Soviet law regulates the execution of death sentences,
theoretically it is interesting to speculate on the likelihood of the execution of such in absentia death sentences outside Soviet territory. This
topic has direct relevance to the right to return to one's country.
However, I shall refrain from discussing this question here since I
lack reliable information.
Although plainly one cannot hope to secure freedom to leave a country
for convicted citizens before this freedom is achieved for other citizens,
discussion of this topic is important not only for the theoretical elaboration
of the principle that everyone has the right to leave a country but,
hopefully, also for possible realization of this right in specific individual
cases.
COMMENTS BY HUSSEIN A. HASSOUNA*

Mr. Ghai has put the problem of expulsion of the British nationals
of Asian origin from Uganda in its right perspective: It must be looked
at not as a sui generis but as an example of the policy of Africanization
being carried out in the whole of Africa. That policy is in conformity
with the many UN resolutions adopted by the General Assembly since
1962, on the right of states to permanent sovereignty over all their natural
resources.
The measures of expulsion were in accordance with international
law which allows each state to expel aliens from its territory. The
Government of Uganda provided for compensation; and the expulsion
* Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations.

was carried out peacefully. Nor do these measures constitute any violation under the relevant provisions of the various international instruments
of human rights: e.g., Article 1(2) of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Article 2(3) of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
and Article 13 ofthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The right to leave a country is certainly an important right but the
importance attached to it is by no means universal. This reflects a basic
difference of approach in which the Western countries emphasize political and civil rights, while the non-Western countries and all developing
countries emphasize economic and social rights which, in their view,
are essential for the exercise of political and civil rights. It follows
from this basic difference of approach that whereas in Western opinion
the right to leave should be absolute and unqualified, most developing
countries see it subject to limitations and qualifications. Indeed, to
open the door for unrestricted emigration would run counter to the vital
interests of any developing society. With this consideration in mind,
the General Assembly, in its recent resolution on the outflow of trained
personnel from developing to developed countries, called for the drafting
of guidelines for a program of action indicating viable measures that
can be taken to deal with the problem, and, above all, practical and
effective guidelines to be followed, mainly by the governments of industrial countries, to put an end to that process and reverse it.
Limitations on the right to leave may also be found in the various
international instruments on human rights. In order to define the right
to leave correctly and determine its scope, the relevant provisions of
the international instruments must be read as a whole: Thus Article
13 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights must be read in conjunction with Article 29 and Article 12(3) of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.
Turning to Mr. Chalidze's statement that a state should not be allowed
to make permission for a person to depart dependent upon a guarantee
that a person will be admitted to the country of destination, it seems
to me that such a prerequisite by a state would be in conformity with
its duty of protection over its citizens. Also, it would tend to prevent
cases of statelessness.
Moreover the right to leave a country cannot be fully exercised unless
there is a right of entry into another country. If there is an obligation
upon a state to let everyone leave it, there must be a corresponding
obligation on other states to let people enter it without discrimination.
Barriers imposed by states on entry, such as quota systems or racial
and religious requirements, must be lifted.
Mr. Chalidze further stated that the right of a convicted person to
leave a country should be recognized, if that person does not want to
live in the society whose interests are protected by the state which
condemned him. It seems to me that this claim looks at criminal punishment as a means of social defense, but overlooks completely the essential
deterrent effect of criminal punishment in a given society. Moreover,

it denies that an individual has not only rights but also duties and responsibilities, a major one being to abide by existing laws. Opposition to
such laws should not be expressed by violating them but rather by either
trying to change them or, failing this, moving to another country where
different laws prevail.
With respect to the right to return, I agree that Mr. Chen has put
the problem in the right perspective in referring to the closed national
boundary system of today which impedes the freedom of movement
of people in general. However, in referring to different group claims
for the right of return, the speaker gave among his examples the Jews
in the Arab countries, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere, seeking to return
to Israel. To portray the problem of those Jews this way as seeking
return to Israel is completely incorrect, since what they are really seeking
is to settle in a country in which they were neither born nor ever lived.
As to the Arab refugees seeking to return to Palestine, I wish to
emphasize that, since the establishment of the new international legal
order following World War II, there has never been a more striking
case where the right of return of a people has been, on the one hand,
continuously upheld and reaffirmed by the international community,
while on the other hand, consistently denied by a state.
International recognition of the right of return of the Palestinians,
first expressed by the UN General Assembly in 1948, has been reaffirmed
year after year in various resolutions. Although these resolutions may
be considered, from a technical point of view, mere recommendations,
their adoption over the past twenty-five years by an overwhelming majority of UN members, endows them with considerable authority and
weight.
To conclude, all relevant international instruments on human rights
refer to both the right to leave and the right to return. In my opinion,
not only should the right of return be put on an equal footing with
the right to leave, but the former should even take precedence and
acquire priority over the latter. The reason for this being that the right
of return, unlike the right to leave, is invoked in most cases by those
who have been subject to two violations: violation of their right to stay
in their country when they are illegally expelled therefrom, and violation
of their right to go back to their country.
COMMENTS BY SIDNEY LISKOFSKY*

The proposals of Mr. Chalidze and Mr. Chen are intriguing, but I
would characterize their innovations as on the "frontier" at this time.
Mr. Chalidze proposed the option of exile, in effect, as an alternate
form of punishment for both political and common crimes-though, he
considered, in practical terms the option would be available only to
persons convicted for political acts. Many questions come to mind
regarding this proposal, such as the uncertainty ofthe distinction between
* American Jewish Committee.

political and common crimes, and whether governments might not use
the option to impose increasingly severe penalties so as to drive political
dissenters into exile. However, I think it more urgent for the present
discussion to concentrate on the right to leave as it applies to the ordinary
citizen who has not been prosecuted or convicted for illegal acts, political
or other, but who wishes to begin his life anew in another country for
whatever reason.
As to Mr. Chen's proposal, while it is surely an ideal worth striving
for, I wonder how one could translate it into a workable norm of universal
applicability. A proposal along similar lines was found impractical at
last June's Uppsala Colloquium on the Right to Leave and Return. The
farthest the experts at that Colloquium were able to go beyond the
existing international law standard, which limits the right to return to
nationals, was to extend it to non-nationals, including stateless persons,
other than in the most exceptional circumstances. This corresponded
to the standard suggested at a conference of legal experts on freedom
of movement, sponsored by the International Commission of Jurists in
1968 in Bangalore, India.
I shall focus my remaining remarks on the right to leave, in respect
to which it might be of interest to contrast the tenor and content of
two recent international convocations-the nongovernmental Uppsala
Colloquium and the intergovernmental UN Commission on Human
Rights. The contrast provides a glimpse ofhow political reality measures
up to the ideals which the panelists and other independent experts and
civic groups espoused.
The participants at Uppsala elaborated on the draft principles in the
1963 Ingl6s study of Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration, which
principles the United Nations had "placed on ice" for a decade. The
declaration adopted at Uppsala reaffirmed Article 13(2) and called on
all states to recognize and implement it. It focused particularly on the
various forms of coercion, official and unofficial, used by governments
to inhibit the exercise of the right, including renunciation or direct revocation of nationality; penalties and harrassment; special fees and taxes;
burdensome documentation and other formalities; and unreasonable
application of national security and other limitations on the right permitted in the Universal Declaration and Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It proposed a clear and present danger qualification for
the national security limitation and took a forthright libertarian view
on the brain drain consideration (which presumably comes within the
Universal Declaration's general welfare limitation). It emphasized the
right of appeal and petition on both the national and international levels.
Article 13(2), as spelled out in the Ingl6s draft principles, came up
at long last for discussion at the Human Rights Commission in Geneva
several weeks ago. The comparison with Uppsala was less than inspiring. Though the resolution adopted by the Commission "affirmed the
importance" of the right in the article, it merely drew the draft principles
to the attention of governments and other institutions, carefully avoiding
language suggestive of approval; in contrast the Commission expressed

its "hope" that states would "take into account" other sets of draft principles spelling out particular rights, adopted at the same session. The
resolution also omitted any reference, express or implied, such as contained in the other resolutions, to the goal of an international instrument
spelling out the right to leave and return. Most important, the Commission deleted from a prior draft of the resolution a routine closing paragraph
retaining the subject on the agenda, despite a strong plea from the Italian
and Austrian delegates to retain it. The Soviet delegate applauded this
deletion as substantiating his government's view that the right to leave
a country was not a fundamental right.
Fortunately, the negative impact of the Commission's resolution was
partially reversed when, on May 11, it came up for review in the Social
Committee of the Economic and Social Council. Italy, joined by Denmark, Sweden, and Trinidad-Tobago, offered an amendment to the Commission resolution by which it would retain the subject on its agenda.
The amendment was approved by 20-4-10, with Hungary, Poland, the
Ukraine, and the USSR voting against, and Algeria, Argentina, Chile,
Madagascar, Niger, Pakistan, Peru, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and Zaire,
abstaining. The Soviet Union made a last minute, again unsuccessful,
effort during the closing meeting of ECOSOC's plenary to reverse the
Social Committee's decision, by requesting a re-vote. In a separate
vote on the paragraph retaining the subject on the agenda, the count was
12-5-7.
I have my doubts as to the prospects of UN action in the near future
in elucidation and furtherance of the right in Article 13(2), in view of
the East European and Third World inclination to subordinate in the
human rights work of the international organization the "classical" civil
and political rights to the priority goals of eliminating colonialism,
apartheid, and racial discrimination in Southern Africa, and promoting
economic and social development in the less developed countries. It
is regrettable that the pursuit of these important goals is being used
to justify curtailment or even destruction of fundamental rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration.
I would call your attention to a statement pertinent to this very situation
by Wilfred Jenks, Director-General of ILO, himself an eminent jurist,
in the introduction to his 1968 report to the International Labour Conference. Mr. Jenks observed that, although ILO was particularly concerned with freedom of association, forced labor, and economic rights
generally, all the other fundamental civic rights, such as freedom of
opinion, expression, and information, the right of people to express their
will in honest election, etc. "are, in a general way, such as to assist
in creating the conditions needed if individuals are to want to improve
their lot and to be able to do so .

. .

."

While the economic and social

rights are ends in themselves, and also help, "sometimes decisively-to
realize fundamental aspirations to freedom and equality," those rights
"cannot be achieved without promoting fundamental human rights and
freedoms." In the introduction to his 1970 report, he reiterated his
view that "freedom of association is meaningless without freedom from

arbitrary arrest and detention, freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of assembly, the right to a fair trial," and that trade union rights
"rest essentially on civil liberties."
What Mr. Jenks said applies no less to the right to freedom of movement,
including that aspect of it which is guaranteed in Article 13(2) of the
Universal Declaration. No social goals, whatever their prioritywhether decolonization, combating racism, safeguarding national security, controlling brain drain, or promoting economic developmentcan justify negation or unreasonable restriction of this right.
CLOSING REMARKS BY MR. CHEN:

Dr. Hassouna questioned the appropriateness of my inclusion of the
claims of Jews to return to Israel on the ground that they want to settle
there, not to return. This question illustrates the complexity of the
group claims for return and the need for clarification. Return implies
a certain subjectivity and identification on the part of claimants in relation
to the area to which they wish to go. Many Jews outside Israel do
believe they have significant ties with Israel and identify it as their
homeland. In this sense, claims ofJews to return to Israel were included
in the examples of group claims. It was meant to be descriptive, not
preferential.
A gentleman suggested that there was a potential danger in the policy
favoring freedom of movement which I had recommended. Our strong
presumption for freedom of return is a presumption: it is neither absolute
nor unqualified. Under some conditions freedom of return must, like
other freedoms, give way to the appropriate policy of public order.
Policies here, as in all law, are complementary. The presumption in
favor of freedom of return needs to be balanced by public order considerations-the maintenance of security, health, development, absorbing capacity, and so on for the particular community, having regard also
for the impact on other states, the regional community, and the world
community. These factors need to be evaluated contextually. To extend
the right of return from nationals to all other persons who have significant
ties with a particular community would be an important interim step
toward a world community honoring freedom of movement.
CLOSING REMARKS BY MR. CHALIDZE

The right to leave is not just a right to travel, a right to return to
one's historic homeland, a right to contact with scientists. The right
is the ultimate defense, the last legal means of defense from persecution
and also exploitation of one's talent. And this right of defense is in
every case more important than the brain-drain problem. The experience of the Jews in Germany in the 1930's evidences that the right
of departure can indeed mean the difference between life and death.
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